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Intellectual Maintenance and  
Misguided Educational Reform
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Nakia Pope (The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio)
It’s becoming almost a cliché to say the humanities are under siege. Perhaps more than other disciplines, philosophy seems threatened. 
Philosophy is seen as too abstract, distant from the 
concerns of the everyday person. My general conten-
tion, however, is that most people outside of the humani-
ties do not know what philosophy— as a field— does at 
all. The majority of students who sign up for my 
introduction to philosophy class do so because it fulfills 
a general education requirement and because it fits their 
schedule. It’s not that they are uninterested in philoso-
phy. It is just they have no idea what philosophy does, 
guided as they are by incessant messages about the 
economic utility of higher education and emerging from a K– 12 school 
system that’s come to be dominated by standardized testing.
What Philosophy Can Do (2015) by Gary Gutting stands as 
both an informative look at the current state of philosophy and an 
argument about the value the humanities in higher education. It 
also makes a significant proposal for educational reform, one that 
places the humanities at the center of resisting consumer capital-
ism. I agree both with the need for this resistance and with the 
necessity of the humanities to it. Unfortunately, Gutting’s proposal 
is deeply undemocratic.
Gutting (2015) does demystify the activity of contemporary 
philosophy, arguing that the key value of philosophy is in “intellec-
tual maintenance”— the continual reexamination of beliefs. At a 
general level, this is an argument about the humanities or even a 
broad liberal arts education. We ought to engage in this sort of 
education in order to continually form and refine a self, testing our 
beliefs against evidence and logic. Beliefs ought to have some sort 
of foundation; one ought to be consistently engaged in the process 
of interrogating those beliefs in light of new arguments, experi-
ences, and data. In this, Gutting echoes 3,000 years of Western 
philosophical history. Gutting is optimistic about this project: 
“Most people are interested in better understanding 
their cherished beliefs, deriving logical consequences 
of these beliefs, and . . . answering challenges from 
those who disagree” (Gutting, 2015,  
p. 248), though given the rhetoric in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, I am not so sure. Regardless, 
intellectual maintenance is thus about this traditional 
function of education. It involves being clear about 
what our convictions mean. It also involves respond-
ing to challenges to those commitments in a reasoned 
and honest way.
In the initial chapters, Gutting (2015) demon-
strates intellectual maintenance at work, illustrating 
principles and methods fundamental to philosophical activity. He 
then brings those principles and methods to bear on contemporary 
issues. The politics chapter, for instance, primarily becomes a 
vehicle for discussing effective argumentation. It discusses the 
difference between inductive and deductive reasoning and 
illustrates argumentative principles. Later chapters on science, 
religion, and art expand this ground. Philosophy has rich concep-
tual tools and historical resources for intellectual maintenance. But 
this is indeed maintenance— tinkering, refining, repairing. 
Philosophy is not, as much as Descartes would have it otherwise, 
the source of unshakable beliefs. As Gutting himself puts it, 
“Philosophy is a major resource for but not a source [emphasis in 
original] of our convictions.” (Gutting, 2015, p. 140). Again, it’s not a 
huge leap to extend this approach to liberal arts education more 
broadly conceived.
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The work is not, however, just an attempt to convince particu-
lar individuals of the value of philosophy. Philosophy and the 
humanities exist in an educational and economic system. While the 
majority of chapters in the book serve as an example of intellectual 
maintenance and provide tools for such activity, two chapters, titled 
“Happiness, Work, and Capitalism” and “Education in a Capitalist 
Society,” serve a different purpose. Here, Gutting moves from a 
focus on individual intellectual cultivation to larger social, political, 
and economic circumstances that are obstacles to such cultivation. 
Consumer capitalism, with its unrelenting focus on constructing a 
self through consumption of goods, stands as the principal obstacle 
to an intellectual life. Schooling is the best way to cultivate resis-
tance to these capitalist tendencies. Unfortunately, it is here— in the 
recommendations for educational reform— that Gutting goes 
significantly awry.
While Gutting (2015) believes that education is the primary 
way individuals can build up a resistance to the demands of 
capitalism, he also recognizes that capitalism isn’t going away 
soon. Education thus serves two purposes: first, to prepare 
students to participate in the economy and, second, to engage in 
the world of ideas. Not everyone wants or needs the second. K– 12 
education is where education for economic participation ought to 
occur. This education consists of basic literacy, numeracy, writing 
skills, and basic foreign language competence. Such an instru-
mental education would then lay the foundation for employment 
and, if necessary, specialized higher education. “From the 
standpoint of employment, high school graduates with such 
training would not need a college degree unless they wanted to be 
accountants or engineers, pursue pre- professional programs . . . 
or train for doctoral work . . . Apart from this, the primary reason 
for going to college is its intellectual culture” (Gutting, 2015,  
p. 176). College is for the cultivation of this “intellectual culture”— 
 a broad education in the liberal arts and sciences for the curious 
and motivated. This culture is one of ideas, advanced by research 
faculty. One ought to go to college only if one wants to participate 
in these conversations of ideas with faculty who have made the 
pursuit of ideas their life’s work. Instrumental training is better 
accomplished by those teachers who aren’t so interested in ideas, 
and given to those students who are simply looking for the skills 
necessary to secure jobs.
There is something insidious and self- serving in the book’s 
educational proposals. First, there is an ignorant misdiagnosis of 
the problems of K– 12 education. According to Gutting (2015), 
teachers are to blame for the flaccid, empty curriculum of K– 12 
education. Teachers come from the lower strata of college students 
and are not intellectually curious. They are the reason students 
don’t arrive at college prepared to engage in intellectual work. 
They are the reason high school graduates are not instrumentally 
prepared for good jobs. This is so simplistic as to be laughable to 
anyone who seriously engages with K– 12 schooling on a scholarly 
basis. What Philosophy Can Do displays little understanding of 
the social and economic conditions of schooling itself, despite 
holding the idea of educational reform as the way to counter the 
economic effects of capitalism. There is exactly one sentence 
about students in poverty, for example. This, however, is 
presented as an obstacle to be overcome in order to attract better 
teachers. This lack of attention to economic forces and the impact 
they have on K– 12 education is odd, considering the entire 
purpose of higher education is to move one away from being 
constrained by consumerism.
Which brings me to the second point. There is a neglect of the 
democratic purposes of education, likely stemming from the 
book’s insistence on an Aristotelian dualism to explain the ideal 
differences between K– 12 education and college. Instrumental 
education is contrasted to intellectual culture, with little room left 
for the democratic point that the two may significantly overlap. Do 
accountants need to think deeply about ideas? Do carpenters need 
to critically examine their own moral commitments? The text 
never explicitly says no, but it’s hard to see how people in those 
vocations might participate in the sort of intellectual culture the 
book promotes if they aren’t engaged in higher education. Nor is 
there room for the possibility that those who work with their 
hands might have things to contribute to intellectual culture that 
arise from the sort of manual work that defines their lives. In short, 
there is a deep division between thinkers and doers, between 
liberal and instrumental education, that is embedded within the 
book’s proposed educational system.
Overcoming this Aristotelian division is one of the explicit 
purposes of Dewey’s Democracy and Education, yet What 
Philosophy Can Do only briefly mentions Dewey in the chapter on 
philosophy of science. Given that Gutting’s book makes a substan-
tive educational proposal, it ought to engage with the intersection 
between political systems, economic systems, schooling, and the 
ideal of an educated person— in short, philosophy of education.  
It does not. Philosophy of education is not simply ignored; it is 
outright dismissed: “Recently, philosophy of education has not 
been an especially fruitful field” (Gutting, 2015, p. 273). Perhaps 
Democracy and Education isn’t recent. But work on the profession-
alization of teaching (something Gutting supports) is certainly 
prominent within the field, as is significant work on capitalism and 
schooling. This is a pity, because much could be found in philoso-
phy of education that would contribute to the work.
What Philosophy Can Do is an ambitious book, in that it 
attempts to explain and justify an entire field of academic study 
to those outside the discipline. What it is really doing, however, 
is articulating the value of a fairly traditional liberal arts 
education— with philosophy at its core— in an era of global 
consumer capitalism. I am deeply sympathetic to his diagnosis 
of our social ills; I am less sanguine about his educational 
prescription for the remedy, given his misunderstanding of our 
educational situation and his failure to engage with educational 
literature. While What Philosophy Can Do serves as a useful map 
to the current terrain of philosophy, it falls short of being a 
helpful guide to how philosophy might help build the social and 
educational institutions that might promote intellectual 
maintenance.
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